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What is Humanitarian Intervention?

 Who is it meant to protect? What are the misconceptions involved with the notion?

Critical arguments for and against the policy.

 

Humanitarian intervention is an undefinable concept, it is intangible and multifaceted, potentially open to exploitation and manipulation. Iain Atack, when discussing humanitarian intervention from an ethical perspective, proclaimed it as a, ‘conflict between our responsibility to protect and promote Human right because of our obligation to respect state sovereignty as a basis for International Order’[1]. This implies a common theme that academics use when attempting to define such the notion; that there should be or perhaps has been, a set of rules amongst states, a coercive and systematic order to allow for global peace. However, during the 1990’s, the topic of humanitarian intervention was looked through abusers and their victims[2]; whilst simultaneously legitimising war and the use of force[3]. The difficulty with defining humanitarian intervention is with it being a paradoxical term, can lives be improved and reduce suffering by intervening through military action? Was the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 humanitarian intervention or was it for self-interest and political gain? Actions (or lack of) in Kosovo, Iraq, Syria and Rwanda; were there clear rules and guidelines for states to follow? This essay will explore various positions for and against humanitarian intervention, whilst simultaneously answering the question, who is it there to protect? It hypothesises that humanitarian intervention is a screen for self-interest and political gain as states utilise and manipulate the concept to promote themselves on a global scale.


A primary position set forth by Morgenthau when discussing political power post World War II, stated that “International politics like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim[4]". This ideologue of realism suggests that the intention of a nation is partially irrelevant, they can cloak actions based on humanitarianism but ultimately they seek; economic, social and world power.

A rhetoric of regime change is often used to legitimise intervention, which carries a distinction within it, as regimes are said to be, “more permanent forms of political organisations than specific governments[5]”. Therefore, if one is required to reconstruct a state’s regime, they are changing more than just a government, which must be based on humanitarian grounds. When conceptualising the word ‘humanitarian’ independently, one rationale is seeking to improve human welfare. This is the common ethos of organisations such as the United Nations, who state in their original charter one of their key purposes is; “to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character[6]”. Similarly, the term ‘human rights’ was mentioned seven times throughout the first charter, making it clear that the human, the individual, is the priority. A rather popular argument for the use of humanitarian intervention is whilst using the discourse of human rights for regime change. A core example of such was with the conclusion of World War II, removing Germany, Italy and Japan from power. The problem then lies post World War II the US had become the predominent global power, but one could argue a leadership vacuum developed. Now, they were not afraid to use force to impose new regimes, when they wanted it, as seen in the cases of Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.


A key question to ask here is, do the changes work, and do they reflect a positive outcome? The evidence would suggest not. The aim is often said to be for addressing the humanitarian aspect whilst simultaneously improving interstate relations. However, looking at Afghanistan in the early 2000s, for example, the Bush administration of the US aided in the appointment of Hamid Karzai as the new leader. But, the tensions between Karzai and the US became so strained that he made a statement to the US, “To the American people, give them my best wishes and my gratitude. To the US. Government, give them my anger, my extreme anger[7]". It is often in these regime changes that the instigator is inflicting their own ideologies on the instigated. One feels that the regime change is required to build stability to create human rights and promote humanitarianism, while the other feels as though they are being pushed around by a school bully, threatened if uncompliant. Therefore, it can be argued that regime change is a mask for a state’s self-interest. It is an inherent mistruth that humanitarian intervention in this context is to protect the suffering individual, but rather to inflict one’s own ideology.


Self-interest through political diction masking as humanitarian intervention occurs when the state knows that they would not receive full support for their action. The Iraq invasion of 2003, by the US, is sometimes argued as a humanitarian intervention due to the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or chemical weapons, whilst simultaneously arguing that it is was in response to the September 11 attacks, part of the American ‘War on Terror’. If these weapons had been found, then there would have been a legal reason for intervention through the UN’s International Law. Two issues arise here: firstly, there were no WMD’s or chemical weapons found, and those that were involved with the attacks had no direct link to Iraq. In 2003, the Washington Post reported the following, “Vice President Cheney has continued to suggest that an Iraqi intelligence agent met with a September 11 hijacker five months before the attacks[8].” This then led to the war that is arguably America’s longest and most costly, estimated at somewhere between US$4 - US$6 trillion[9]. My point is,  Humanitarian intervention here is used as a mask for a differing purpose, rather than a global co-operation to aid human life. The US was using their own self-interest and political goals without regarding the implications of their actions and creating links that did not exist. They had used the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a political rhetoric in order to allow for policy-making that favours the state. Policy makers often use catch phrases and rhetorical devices in this way, to influence voters and gain support whilst cloaking the extent of the issue. For example, ‘collateral damage’ is used for unintentionally killed civilians[10], and ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ (EIT) really signifies torture. EIT’s were criticised following the interrogation of detainees during the Iraq war by the US, as Senator John McCain stated: “I have long believed some of these practises amounted to torture[11].”  Both examples seem to show a level of intent and knowledge but by using a softer rhetoric. Therefore, they are using these softer terms for deception and self-interest, in order to gain the publics’s support at the time, without any regard for long-term strategy, as Morgenthau suggested.

There are certain and very particular set of circumstances whereby humanitarian intervention comes with necessity rather than for economic or political goals and can protect those that require protection. Take the case in Libya for example, in 2011 Gaddafi had demonstrated an intent to commit a massacre, through his “no mercy” speech[12]. This infamous statement called for his supporters to ‘cleanse’ Benghazi. There are a set of circumstances that must be met for intervention to be permissible, otherwise known as ‘just cause’, which bring forth a requirement of genocide or similar massacres[13]. Although, some would argue that the requirements of just cause are too high. The International Commission on Intervention and state sovereignty set forth a new set of requirements which are: large scale loss of life (with or without genocidal intent), ethnic cleansing (this can be carried out through killing, expulsion or acts of terror)[14], and a rather broader set of rules that aim to protect the individual. In Libya, these requirements were possibly met and so some could argue that just cause was met and therefore intervention was permissible. The protection of innocent people from a massacre should be of paramount importance. The line cannot be crossed from protection into forced regime change as this becomes a political motive and is inflicting one’s political choice on another.  


Just cause is subjective rather than objective, what one may think as humanitarian another may not. Take the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. The US- led, NATO deciding to launch a humanitarian intervention is debatable, as it can be described as having moral legitimacy as well as some who reject it as a humanitarian war. There is debate to what occurred pre-1999 but there is universal recognition to that if the reports were accurate, then the behaviour was immoral[15]. The war in Kosovo is a rather interesting one that includes mistruths by media and distorting the truth from the public[16].  This in turn created creating the perfect opportunity to intervene., Iit also allowed the rhetoric to become the norm and convinced the public that the bombing was necessary and ‘just’, creating a humanitarian war due to the ethnic cleansing that had occurred.


The juxtapositional term of ‘humanitarian war’ had become the accepted terminology for such an intervention. One argument against the bombing is the claim that the continuous air-attacks exasperated extreme violence against Kosovars with Kosovar refugees said to have been held at gun-point to flee Kosovo, which comes under the United Nations ethnic cleansing definitions[17]. It has been stated that the primary motivation for the bombing was to maintain the US status as the world sole superpower. This being because NATO is led by the US and there are rich oil deposits within the Caspian Sea[18]. Therefore, by encouraging the bombing, rather than attempting to resolve the issue through diplomatic means, as this display of power is a form of self-interest. There was a clear lack of humanitarianism whilst using the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention and a failing failure to protect those that were being subjugated to harm by dropping bombs rather than attempting diplomatic routes.

If the intervention was necessary, passing the aforementioned ‘just cause’ test and UN laws, and the outcome was successful in the host state, if the intervening state profits from that domestically or internationally, then it can be seen as irrelevant because the intervention was successful. Firstly, to determine whether the intervention was successful one can look at those that did not die. This can be viewed during a humanitarian crisis; if individuals would have died without assistance but did not die due to the actions of military intervention, then this can be regarded as a successful intervention[19]. A possible example of a successful intervention can be seen at Sierra Leone, whereby British troops intervened on a civil war that had lasted between 1991-2002[20]. The UN and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) attempted to intervene, but it was not until the British intervention when the violence stopped. Estimates show that 70,000 people had been killed during this civil war[21]. How many would have died through the butchery that existed without such intervention? If one looks at those that did not die because of the intervention, then Sierra Leone surely becomes a standout success. Furthermore, Sierra Leone has become more stable since the end of the civil war and is said to have completed a fair election in 2018[22].


 Although it may be deemed a successful intervention, there were actions taken that negate such thought. The British Government’s profile of Sierra Leone states that, “Sierra Leone has been supportive in international discussions and supports our efforts to increase the return of foreign nationals.[23]” Two possible deductions can be made here, firstly; that the UK would lean on their new ally when called for in a diplomatic setting. Secondly, the UK can push for an increase in deportation as set out in the 2014 immigration bill which also states; “remove as many foreign national offenders (FNO) as quickly as possible, to protect the public”[24]. Deportation becomes so much easier when one of the stipulations for aid is to accept offenders willingly. Added to this, FNO’s can only appeal a decision once outside of the UK. There is a clear and political goal gained through the intervention here, the UK has made an ally to bolster any vote the UK takes part in, and to accept any offender that they we do not want anymore. There is an intent here, they are suggesting that they do not want a certain character. It is a very tight rope which can easily stray into ethnic cleansing, as the United Nations regards as: “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area[25].” It is not difficult for the policy to blend with intent and as such force can sometimes follow.  


Selling arms to another state negates the effective ability to intervene if necessary. If you supply arms which are used against their people, you are part of the issue. The UK in 2018 was examined by the NGO, Action on Armed Violence, they discovered that between 2007 and 2017, the UK had exported arms to 29 of the 30 priority country list (the list is designed to ‘defend human rights and promote democracy worldwide’ and includes Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya)[26]. This appears to be juxtaposed to the point of the human rights list. To protect them or defend them is a very manipulated definition when one is arming them. Humanitarian intervention and war are separate, and so the UK exporting so many arms may not be necessarily relevant. However, when one state supplies arms to another, and then that state commits mass crimes, forcing the former to intervene then you have inadvertently manufactured the cause for intervention yourself. Take Saudi Arabia and Yemen for example; the UK sold £7.3 billion worth of arms to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) between 2008 and– 2017[27]. In 2018, Human Rights Watch published an article asserting: “the coalition has conducted scores of indiscriminate and disproportionate airstrikes killing thousands of civilians and hitting civilian objects in violation of the law of wars.[28]” Therefore, if the attacks worsen then the UK may find itself intervening in the conflict on grounds of humanitarianism. If it does, then the UK will be intervening in a conflict they supplied.

Humanitarian intervention when all other options have been exhausted is an argument in favour of the notion. Take Rwanda, whereby in in 100 days in 1994, 800,000 Tutsi people were slaughtered[29]. Taking all else out of consideration, there is a simple moral obligation that exists to intervene. The failure to do so under the parameters set forth by the UN to protect is impermissible. The speed and the ferocity of the attacks create an easy opportunity to claim that one did not anticipate the attacks, as the US often asserted. However, when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) opened an official inquiry, they commented: ‘The International community knew that something terrible was underway in Rwanda. If not genocide, it was at least a catastrophe of so great a magnitude that it should command international intervention.’ In 1996, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) concluded that; “the international community ignored, discounted the significance of these signs, thereby not only indicating an unwillingness to intervene, but communicating that unwillingness to those who were planning genocide.[30]” Both accounts are terrifying, not the least for they suggest that the International community did nothing, but in fact unintentionally aided the genocide. There is little justification for not intervening here. There are factors such as failures in Somalia that may have contributed to the inaction, but it is from those lessons that one must learn the appropriate response, not ignore the next atrocity. Another factor could stem from the thesis of this essay, and that is that there was nothing to gain for the intervening state and therefore they need not risk their own military.


In conclusion, this essay has discovered that there is no right answer to humanitarian intervention and there is no way to define it exclusively between states. It hypothesised from the outset that humanitarian intervention was a smokescreen for self-interest. Political and economic goals for international gain. There has been substantial evidence to support that argument.


Examples of humanitarian intervention are not the same, they all have their very own distinction which adds to the difficulty of defining it as well as permitting manipulation of it. The problem with the undefinable notion is that, as seen in the arguments above, it becomes the rhetoric for policymaking. As with the case of Iraq, whereby humanitarian intervention was used a reason for the invasion yet there was no intervening taking place.


A key aspect to the essay was the question of who humanitarian intervention is meant to protect. This is a similarly difficult question in that there again is no set standard by which to measure the notion, and therefore it becomes difficult to assess. The evidence would suggest that the protection is offered to the state that wants to inflict the intervention. As seen throughout the cases of Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Libya, the intervening state will benefit politically or economically in the future, or even for a show of power as seen in the case of Kosovo. There can be opposition to the viewpoint that all actions are in self-interest, such as the case for Sierra Leone and Kosovo, but when one looks at the actions taken in the post-aid section of the intervention then one can quite distinctly view the action taken by the UK as one in self-interest. Power is to be gained through intervening in these atrocities. As with Kosovo the actions that were taken (the bombing) allowed for the fleeing of Kosovar refugees by force whilst simultaneously allowing the US to show that they have world power.


There is adequate evidence of states such as the UK and the US utilising humanitarian intervention for their own self-interest as hypothesised in the introduction to this essay. Examples include the diplomatic interest of Sierra Leone for the UK, and the US using the rhetoric to invade Iraq, and the NATO bombing of Kosovo., Whilst using such a rhetoric, the US uses the same invariable torture methods and methods techniques that have been described as reasons for why we should intervene in the Middle East. Some of the key incidents that have occurred at the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century have agreed with Morgenthau and have been under the realism viewpoint that ‘power is the ultimate aim’.


Therefore, the misconceptions involved with humanitarian intervention are designed to be so that states can manipulate them, simply because the playing field changes, each incident whereby one may be required to intervene differs from the last. This creates benefits for the state and policymakers to better their own position globally and achieve that sought-after power. Organisations such as the United Nations in attempting to define the notion are continuously a step behind, because the definition will have changed. This means that those that are to be protected are whoever the state chooses, often being their own state. There have been numerous attempts at creating a clear set of rules, but the rules need be agreed on and in the best interest of everybody, both the developed and developing world. As soon as one state loses out then the rules will be bent, manipulated and interventions become self-interest based. Those that ought to be protected become oppressed and the misconceptions surrounding humanitarian intervention become convoluted to the point of meaningless expression.


 

Notes

 

Atack, Iain, “Ethical Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,” Sage Publications Security Dialogue Vol 33, 3 (3 September 2002), 279-280, ISSN 0967-0106 [028852]

BBC NEWS | World | Africa | S Leone Elections 'Free And Fair'". 2007. News.Bbc.Co.Uk. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6943541.stm.

Bilmes, Linda J, The financial legacy of Afghanistan and Iraq: How wartime spending decisions will constrain future US national secretery budgets. The economics of peace and security journal, vol 9, 1 (2014) pg 1-abstract.

Chandler, David, “Resilience and Human Security: The Post Interventionist Paradigm,” Security dialogue Vol 43, 3 (2012), 213, DOI: 10.1177/0967010612444151

Denison, Benjamin, “The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Failure of Regime-Change Operations.” Cato Institute Policy analysis, 883, (January 6, 2020), Pg 2-4

Economist, “Intervention that worked”, (accessed 19 October, 2020), https://www.economist.com/unknown/2002/05/15/intervention-that-worked

Elena, Iulia. 2009. NATO’S Military Intervention In Kosovo And The Diplomatic Alternative. 1st ed. Revista Romaneasca pentru Educatie Multidimensionala.

Fishman, Robert M. 1990. "Rethinking State And Regime: Southern Europe's Transition To Democracy". World Politics 42 (3): 422-428. doi:10.2307/2010418.

Greenwood, Christopher. 2002. Finnish Yearbook Of International Law. 10th ed. Kluwer International Law.

Johnstone, Diana. 2002. Fool's Crusade. 1st ed. Monthly Review Press.

Levinger, Matthew. 2016. "Why The U.S. Government Failed To Anticipate The Rwandan Genocide Of 1994: Lessons For Early Warning And Prevention". Genocide Studies And Prevention 9 (3): 33-35. doi:10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1362.

Miles, Anne Daugherty. 2016. "Perspectives On Enhanced Interrogation Techniques". Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43906.pdf.

Morgenthau, H.J. “Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace”, McGraw-Hill Higher education, 7, (2006), pg 30

Nations, United. 2020. "United Nations Office On Genocide Prevention And The Responsibility To Protect". Un.Org. Accessed October 21. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/ethnic-cleansing.shtml.

Newman, Michael, “Humanitarian Intervention: confronting the contradictions”, London Hurst and Co, (2009),  ISBN: 9781850659747

Overton, Iain, and Maria Calle. 2018. "UK Arms Exports Examined | AOAV". AOAV. https://aoav.org.uk/2018/uk-arms-exports-examined/.

Pattison, James, “The ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya”, Ethics and International Affairs, 25, no 3, (2011) pg 271 – 272

Roberts, Adam. 1999. "NATO's ‘Humanitarian War’ Over Kosovo". Survival 41 (3): 102-105. doi:10.1080/00396339912331342943.

Rwanda Genocide: 100 Days Of Slaughter. 2019. BBC News. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26875506.

Scott, Lucy, “A success story? The British intervention in Sierra Leone revisited”, Oxford Research group, (26 July, 2017). https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/a-success-story-the-british-intervention-in-sierra-leone-revisited

Seybolt, Taylor B. “Humanitarian Military Intervention: the conditions for success and failure”, Oxford University Press, (2007), pg 30-33

Summers, Harry G. 1991. "'Collateral Damage' A Familiar, Often Intended, Part Of War : Air Attacks: The Allies Are Trying To Avoid Civilian Casualties In The Gulf. But Non-Military Areas Have Been Deliberately Targeted In Previous Conflicts.". Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-02-08-mn-942-story.html.

Teson, Fernando R. “Just cause in Humanitarian Intervention”, Debating Humanitarian Intervention: should we try to save strangers, (2018), DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190202903.003.0003

UK Arms Exports to The UAE | AOAV". 2020. AOAV. https://aoav.org.uk/2018/uk-arms-exports-to-the-uae/.”

UK Home Office. 2020. "Policing and Crime Bill - Foreign National Offenders". London: Home Office.

United Nations. “Deliver Humanitarian Aid”, accessed 18 October, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/deliver-humanitarian-aid/index.html

World Report 2019: Rights Trends In Yemen. 2019. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen.

[1] Atack, Iain, “Ethical Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,” Sage Publications Security Dialogue Vol 33, 3 (3 September 2002), 279-280, ISSN 0967-0106 [028852]

[2] Chandler, David, “Resilience and Human Security: The Post Interventionist Paradigm,” Security dialogue Vol 43, 3 (2012), 213, DOI: 10.1177/0967010612444151

[3] Newman, Michael, “Humanitarian Intervention: confronting the contradictions”, London Hurst and Co, (2009),  ISBN: 9781850659747

[4] Morgenthau, H.J. “Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace”, McGraw-Hill Higher education, 7, (2006), pg 30

[5] Fishman, Robert M. 1990. "Rethinking State And Regime: Southern Europe's Transition To Democracy". World Politics 42 (3): 422-428. doi:10.2307/2010418.

[6] United Nations. “Deliver Humanitarian Aid”, accessed 18 October, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/deliver-humanitarian-aid/index.html

[7] Denison, Benjamin, “The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Failure of Regime-Change Operations.” Cato Institute Policy analysis, 883, (January 6, 2020), Pg 2-4

[9] Bilmes, Linda J, The financial legacy of Afghanistan and Iraq: How wartime spending decisions will constrain future US national secretery budgets. The economics of peace and security journal, vol 9, 1 (2014) pg 1-abstract.

[10] Summers, Harry G. 1991. "'Collateral Damage' A Familiar, Often Intended, Part Of War : Air Attacks: The Allies Are Trying To Avoid Civilian Casualties In The Gulf. But Non-Military Areas Have Been Deliberately Targeted In Previous Conflicts.". Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-02-08-mn-942-story.html.

[11] Miles, Anne Daugherty. 2016. "Perspectives On Enhanced Interrogation Techniques". Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43906.pdf.

[13] Teson, Fernando R. “Just cause in Humanitarian Intervention”, Debating Humanitarian Intervention: should we try to save strangers, (2018), DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190202903.003.0003

[14] Pattison, James, “The ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya”, Ethics and International Affairs, 25, no 3, (2011) pg 271 - 272

[15] Greenwood, Christopher. 2002. Finnish Yearbook Of International Law. 10th ed. Kluwer International Law.

[16] Johnstone, Diana. 2002. Fool's Crusade. 1st ed. Monthly Review Press.

[17] Roberts, Adam. 1999. "NATO's ‘Humanitarian War’ Over Kosovo". Survival 41 (3): 102-105. doi:10.1080/00396339912331342943.

[18] Elena, Iulia. 2009. NATO’S Military Intervention In Kosovo And The Diplomatic Alternative. 1st ed. Revista Romaneasca pentru Educatie Multidimensionala.

[19] Seybolt, Taylor B. “Humanitarian Military Intervention: the conditions for success and failure”, Oxford University Press, (2007), pg 30-33

[20] Economist, “Intervention that worked”, (accessed 19 October, 2020), https://www.economist.com/unknown/2002/05/15/intervention-that-worked

[21] Scott, Lucy, “A success story? The British intervention in Sierra Leone revisited”, Oxford Research group, (26 July, 2017). https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/a-success-story-the-british-intervention-in-sierra-leone-revisited

[22] "BBC NEWS | World | Africa | S Leone Elections 'Free And Fair'". 2007. News.Bbc.Co.Uk. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6943541.stm.

[24] UK Home Office. 2020. "Policing and Crime Bill - Foreign National Offenders". London: Home Office.

[25] Nations, United. 2020. "United Nations Office On Genocide Prevention And The Responsibility To Protect". Un.Org. Accessed October 21. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/ethnic-cleansing.shtml.

[26]Overton, Iain, and Maria Calle. 2018. "UK Arms Exports Examined | AOAV". AOAV. https://aoav.org.uk/2018/uk-arms-exports-examined/.

[27] "UK Arms Exports To The UAE | AOAV". 2020. AOAV. https://aoav.org.uk/2018/uk-arms-exports-to-the-uae/.”

[28]"World Report 2019: Rights Trends In Yemen". 2019. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen.

[29] "Rwanda Genocide: 100 Days Of Slaughter". 2019. BBC News. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26875506.

[30] Levinger, Matthew. 2016. "Why The U.S. Government Failed To Anticipate The Rwandan Genocide Of 1994: Lessons For Early Warning And Prevention". Genocide Studies And Prevention 9 (3): 33-35. doi:10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1362.

 
 
 

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